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B lame	is	ubiquitous;	we	frequently	think	that	others	are	doing	wrong,	and	often	we	inwardly	blame	them	for	 it.	We	also	ex-ercise	forbearance;	we	don’t	always	act	on	our	opinion	of	the	
doings	of	others.	I	shall	distinguish	two	forms	of	forbearance:	accom-
modation	and	toleration.	To	accommodate someone’s	bad	behaviour	is	
to	refrain	 from	preventing	or	even	discouraging	 it;	 it	 is	 to	allow	the	
wrong	 to	occur	without	 interference.	To	 tolerate	 their	bad	behaviour	
is	to	refrain	from	expressing	one’s	disapproval	of	it;	it	is	to	allow	the	
wrong	to	pass	without	condemnation	or	reproach.
Many	 vegetarians	 regard	 raising	 animals	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 kill-
ing	and	eating	them	as	a	serious	wrong,	and	they	disapprove	of	carni-
vores	who	encourage	and	commit	such	wrongs,	but	most	vegetarians	
in	most	situations	exercise	forbearance.	They	don’t	take	the	meat	from	
the	shelves	of	butchers	or	the	mouths	of	diners,	nor	do	they	remon-
strate	with	those	who	purvey	and	consume	meat.	Some	vegetarians	
may	wonder	whether	such	forbearance	is	a	good	thing,	whether	they	
are	 in	 fact	 condoning	 the	 eating	 of	meat.	 Before	 tackling	 that	 ques-
tion,	we	must	get	clearer	on	the	nature	and	varieties	of	 forbearance.	
Our	vegetarians	 face	not	one	but	 two	practical	questions,	 two	ques-
tions	about	what	 to	do.	First,	 should	 they	seek	 to	stop	or	at	 least	 to	
discourage	the	eating	of	meat	(i. e.	should	they	refuse	to	accommodate	
it)?	Second,	should	they	express	their	disapproval	of	meat	eating	(i. e.	
should	they	refuse	to	tolerate	it)?
The	distinction	just	highlighted	might	seem	little	more	than	a	mat-
ter	of	emphasis.	If	you	are	sufficiently	moved	by	your	disapproval	of	
meat	 eating	 to	 prevent	 it,	 aren’t	 you	 thereby	 expressing	 your	 disap-
proval	of	meat	eating?	Coercion	may	be	the	best	form	of	condemnation.	
Still	there	is	a	narrower	sense	of	‘expression’	in	which	the	vegetarians	
may	not	be	expressing	blame	or	disapproval	of	the	carnivores	by	inter-
fering	with	them.	Suppose	the	vegetarians	accept	that	the	carnivores	
have	an	excuse	for	eating	meat,	perhaps	because	they	have	some	cause	
to	be	ignorant	of	the	moral	law	on	this	point,	perhaps	for	some	other	
reason.	Where	someone	has	an	excuse,	you	shouldn’t	blame	them	for	
what	 they	do	 (wrong	 though	 it	be)	and	you	 shouldn’t	 express	 such	
feelings	if	you	have	them.	Perhaps	the	vegetarians	can’t	help	blaming	
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neglected	second	issue	alone,	I	may	be	narrowing	ordinary	usage,	but	
there	is	a	question	that	needs	to	be	highlighted,	and	I	shall	do	so	by	
using	‘toleration’	in	this	more	restricted	sense. 
Liberalism	in	both	its	Kantian	and	Millian	forms	contains	a	doc-
trine	of	accommodation,	one	based	largely	on	the	value	of	autonomy.	
According	to	the	liberal,	we	should	often	allow	people	to	do	things	
we	know	to	be	wrong	without	 interference,	because	 they	ought	 to	
be	left	to	live	their	lives	by	their	own	lights.3	I	shall	neither	endorse	
nor	dispute	this	familiar	idea,	but	I	doubt	it	can	resolve	my	question	
of	toleration.	Rather	I	seek	to	ground	our	practices	of	toleration	in	a	
doctrine	of	civility,	 a	doctrine	based	not	on	 the	value	of	autonomy	
but	 rather	 on	 claims	 about	 how	 the	 attitudes	 of	 others	 affect	 our	
well-being.4	This	doctrine	of	 civility	 tells	us	when	 it	 is	 appropriate	
for	people	to	express	their	attitudes	towards	those	around	them.	The	
consequent	doctrine	of	 toleration	tells	us	when	it	 is	appropriate	 to	
express	the	attitude	of	disapproval	in	particular.	In	the	first	section,	
I	consider	civility	quite	generally,	whilst	in	the	second	I	move	onto	
toleration.	Perhaps	our	doctrines	of	civility	and	accommodation	can,	
in	the	end,	be	derived	from	a	common	source,	but	the	formulation	
3.	 For	Mill	the	important	line	is	that	between	cases	where	we	merely	express	
disapproval	and	cases	where	we	use	force	as	an	incentive	to	get	someone	
to	desist.	Mill	allows	that	thinking	someone	a	fool	or	at	fault	is	itself	an	in-
jury,	albeit	an	inconvenience	“inseparable	from	the	unfavourable	judgement	
of	others”.	Being	subject	to	disdain,	contempt,	persuasion,	exhortation	and	
even	social	ostracism	are	other	such	inconveniences.	In	Mill’s	view,	provided	
none	of	these	injuries	are	“purposefully	inflicted	for	the	sake	of	punishment”,	
they	are	not	problematic	 in	 the	way	that	 legal	coercion	 is	 (Mill	 1961:	325).	
See	also	(Mill	1961:	38).
4.	 Another	approach	would	be	 to	base	a	doctrine	of	 civility	on	 the	notion	of	
respect.	Buss	argues	that	showing	proper	respect	for	someone	involves	more	
than	merely	 recognizing	 their	 autonomy	by	accommodating	 their	projects	
and	values	 (Buss	 1999:	 797,	 802–4).	One	must	 also	 “express	 respect””	 and	
thereby	“directly	acknowledge	the	intrinsic	value	of	others”	(Buss	1999:	809).	
This	suggestion	can	be	assessed	only	in	the	light	of	further	elucidation	of	the	
notion	of	respect	(e. g.	might	not	a	proper	respect	for	someone	require	you	to	
express	your	disapproval	of	their	wrongdoing?	[Mill	1961:	324–5]).	If	respect-
ing	 someone	 involves	giving	 suitable	weight	 to	 their	 interest	 in	not	being	
subject	to	certain	forms	of	expression,	Buss’s	suggestion	would	be	consistent	
with	my	own.
the	carnivores,	but	at	least	they’ll	suppress	their	disapproval	and	won’t	
reproach	or	 condemn	 the	behaviour	of	 the	 carnivores.	Still	 the	 veg-
etarians	may	think	meat	eating	ought	to	be	stopped,	simply	in	order	to	
protect	the	animals.	Here	the	vegetarians	feel	entitled	to	act	on	their	
disapproval	of	meat	eating	(and	in	that	sense	express	it)	without	act-
ing	in order to	express	their	disapproval.1
Much	of	the	time	we	act	from	a	mixture	of	motives:	a	vegetarian	
whose	patience	has	worn	thin	may	speak	harshly	to	a	shameless	car-
nivore	both	in	order	to	express	their	own	indignation	and	in	order	to	
stop	the	other	from	eating	meat,	thereby	preventing	the	wrong.	On	
some	such	occasions	the	vegetarian	may	think	hard	words	are	justi-
fied	 only	 because	 they	 have	 reasons	 of	 both	 sorts;	 neither	 by	 itself	
would	suffice.	On	yet	other	occasions,	the	vegetarian	may	not	expect	
to	have	any	influence	or	else	may	not	feel	entitled	to	“bring	pressure	
to	bear”.	They	are	speaking	simply	to	take	a	stand;	their	action	is	pure-
ly	expressive.	
If	 this	 is	 all	 correct,	 the	question	of	whether	 the	 vegetarians	 are	
right	to	forbear	when	confronted	with	the	eating	of	meat	resolves	it-
self	into	two	questions:	First,	should	they	accommodate	the	eating	of	
meat,	or	is	there	sufficient	reason	to	seek	to	prevent	it?	Second,	should	
they	tolerate	the	eating	of	meat,	or	is	there	sufficient	reason	to	express	
their	disapproval	of	it?	Much	writing	on	toleration	either	fails	to	sepa-
rate	these	questions	or	else	directs	our	attention	firmly	to	the	question	
of	 accommodation.2	 In	 employing	 the	word	 ‘toleration’	 to	mark	 the	
1.	 Most	(perhaps	all)	attitudes	involve	a	desire	to	express	those	attitudes:	to	feel	
love,	admiration,	disgust,	contempt	and	disapproval	 is	 in	part	 to	 feel	some	
desire	to	express	those	attitudes.	Even	belief	(I	would	argue)	involves	some	
desire	to	express	that	belief	should	the	occasion	arise	(Owens	2006:	109–10).	
We	need	not	act	on	this	expressive	desire,	but	where	we	do,	we	act	in	order	
to	express	the	relevant	attitude.
2.	 For	 example,	 (Nagel	 1991:	 Chapter	 14),	 (Rawls	 1996:	 3–4),	 (Scanlon	 2003:	
198)	and	(Scheffler	2010:	321–2)	all	focus	on	accommodation.	Hobbes	may	be	
an	exception.	His	fifth	law	of	nature	requires	“that	every	man	strive	to	accom-
modate	himself	 to	 the	rest”,	whilst	his	eighth	 law	of	nature	stipulates	 “that	
no	man,	by	deed,	word,	countenance	or	gesture,	declare	hatred	or	contempt	
of	another”.	Hobbes	distinguishes	both	accommodation	and	toleration	from	
forgiveness	(Hobbes	1994:	95–6).
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An	autonomous	norm	of	civility	 is	a	norm	(other	than	a	norm	of	
adequacy	or	sincerity)	that	governs	the	expression	of	our	attitudes,	a	
norm	derivable	neither	 from	norms	governing	 those	attitudes	 them-
selves	nor	 from	norms	 that	assess	our	expressive	actions	by	 the	de-
sirability	of	 their	 further	consequences. In	 this	paper,	 I	 shall	use	 the	
phrase	 ‘further	 consequences	 of	 X’	 to	 refer	 to	 phenomena	 distinct	
from	X	that	are	the	effects	of	X.	Thus	(if	the	claims	to	come	are	correct)	
harm	to	me	is	not	just	a	further consequence	of	my	friend’s	contempt	
for	me,	because	his	contempt	is	in	itself	a	harm.	By	contrast,	my	feeling	
of	hurt	is	a	further	consequence,	because	this	feeling	is	distinct	from	
the	contempt	that	causes	it.	The	instrumental	value	of	X	is	the	value	it	
derives	from	the	value	of	its	further	consequences.
Norms	of	civility	arise,	I	shall	urge,	from	the	fact	that	it	often	mat-
ters	for	its	own	sake	whether	an	attitude	gains	expression.	Here	I	use	
terms	 like	 ‘matter’	and	 ‘count’	 in	a	narrow	sense.	Something	matters 
(or	counts)	when	it	matters	to	someone	(or	counts	for	someone),	and	
something	matters	 to	 someone	when	 it	makes	 a	 difference	 to	 their	
well-being,	when	it	affects	their	interests,	when	it	helps	to	determine	
how	well	 their	 life	 is	 going.7	On	 this	 usage,	 your	 contempt	matters	
to	me	where	the	fact	that	you	feel	contempt	for	me	makes	my	life	go	
worse,	where	your	contempt	constitutes	an	injury	to	my	interests.8 
I	maintain	that	the	attitudes	of	others	can	matter	to	me	regardless	
of	whether	those	attitudes	gain	expression	and	quite	apart	from	any	
further	consequences	that	the	existence	of	those	attitudes	may	have	
for	me	or	for	anyone	else.	My	life	often	goes	a	bit	worse	if	an	acquain-
tance	despises	me	for	something,	whether	or	not	they	express	this	and	
7.	 In	this	paper	I	focus	on	the	interests	of	the	object	of	an	act	of	expression,	the	
person	to	whom	the	expressed	attitude	refers.	A	fuller	account	would	also	
consider	the	interests	people	have	in	expressing	their	own	attitudes	and	the	
interest	we	all	have	in	whether	or	not	we	are	the	recipients	or	witnesses	of	
acts	of	expression.	The	norms	of	civility	strike	a	balance	between	these	often	
competing	interests.
8.	 Your	contempt	might	also	matter	 to	me	 (or	 to	 someone	else)	 in	a	broader	
sense	of	that	term	in	which	things	that	have	no	impact	on	my	interests	can	
matter	to	me.	I	leave	this	open.
of	 a	 doctrine	 of	 toleration	 should	 not	 await	 the	 realisation	 of	 this	
theoretical	ambition.5
1. Civility
I	begin	with	the	claim	that	there	are	autonomous	norms	of	civility.6 A 
norm	of	civility	tells	us	when	and	how	it	 is	appropriate	to	express	a	
given	attitude.	‘Attitude’	here	covers	the	whole	gamut	of	the	passions:	
disgust,	contempt,	love,	anger,	fear.	It	also	extends	to	judgements,	be-
liefs,	hopes	and	wishes.	‘Aptness’	(or	appropriateness)	must	be	taken	
as	a	primitive,	though	I	will	be	contrasting	it	with	various	notions	(like	
adequacy,	 sincerity,	 accuracy	and	desirability)	 as	 the	discussion	pro-
ceeds.	‘Expression’	is	another	primitive.	
Are	there	autonomous	norms	of	civility?	Few	would	deny	that	the	
expression	of	an	attitude	can	be	more	or	less	adequate;	for	a	start	you	
can	 express	 your	 attitude	 poorly	 through	 incompetence	 or	 insincer-
ity.	But	not	all	adequate	expressions	of	attitude	are	apt:	I	can	express	
my	anger	or	my	love	with	great	precision	and	candour	though	quite	
inappropriately.	And	this	may	be	so	even	if	the	love	or	anger	is	itself	
entirely	apt.	Thus	at	least	one	aspect	of	the	aptness	of	an	expressive	
action	derives	neither	from	the	aptness	of	the	attitude	it	expresses	nor	
from	the	adequacy	of	its	expression.	
Perhaps	apt	expression	is	expression	with	desirable	consequences?	
I	 doubt	 civility	 can	be	 explained	 in	 this	way:	 telling	 someone	what	
they	need	 to	know	might	be	uncivil	 though	desirable	on	 the	whole.	
Should	 we	 instead	 focus	 on	 some	 specific	 desirable	 consequence?	
Hume	maintains	that	the	possession	of	good	manners	is	“a	quality	im-
mediately	agreeable	to	others”	(Hume	1975:	Section	8),	but	the	same	
can	be	 true	of	 unmannerly	behaviour.	An	off-colour	 joke	or	 a	 rude	
gesture	is	often	thoroughly	enjoyed,	especially	when	the	butt	of	 the	
joke	is	not	present.	And	good	manners	can	be	grating.
5.	 Rawls	includes	a	“duty	of	civility”	in	his	doctrine	of	accommodation	(Rawls	
1999:	217),	but	my	usage	is	different.	
6.	 The	fact	that	the	word	‘autonomy’	occurs	both	in	‘value	of	autonomy’	and	in	
‘autonomous	norm	of	civility’	is	an	unfortunate	coincidence.
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Y,	though	X’s	attitude	has	little	effect	on	what	Y	thinks	or	feels	on	the	
topic:	 counting	 is	not	 the	same	 thing	as	 influence.	 In	a	 relationship	
of	common	purpose,	like	a	sports	team	or	military	unit,	an	important	
source	of	motivation	is	the	idea	that	it	matters	to	you	what	your	lead-
er	or	 teammates	 think	of	 you	 (though	 reluctant	 soldiers	need	 to	be	
taught	to	care	about	this).
Furthermore,	it	matters	to	me	that	there	should	be	people	for	whom	
my	attitudes	count	and	also	people	whose	attitudes	count	for	me.	Part	
of	the	point	of	making	the	above-mentioned	personal	connections	is	
to	ensure	that	this	is	so.10	One	good	thing	about	having	a	friend	is	that	
it	matters	to	each	of	us	how	the	other	regards	us.	Of	course,	I	wouldn’t	
welcome	my	friend’s	thoughts	about	my	foolish	marriage,	but	I	do	wel-
come	our	 having	 the	 sort	 of	 connection	 that	 ensures	 that	 their	 atti-
tude	towards	my	marriage	matters	to	me	and	vice versa.	To	be	a	person	
whose	attitudes	 count	 for	nothing	and	 for	whom	no	one’s	 attitudes	
count	would	be	deeply	dispiriting.
Given	that	someone’s	attitudes	matter	to	me,	it	also	matters	to	me	
whether	those	attitudes	gain	expression,	at	least	where	the	expression	
is	public	(Owens	2012:	63–4).	This	point	may	be	too	easily	conceded.	
Many	would	agree	that	where	an	acquaintance	either	communicates	
their	contempt	to	me,	or	else	communicates	their	contempt	to	other	
people	whose	attitude	to	me	is	affected,	that	will	likely	make	my	life	
go	worse	in	all	sorts	of	ways.	But	the	point	does	not	turn	(solely)	on	
such	further	effects.	Suppose	my	colleagues	think	me	an	inept	philoso-
pher	and	they	mock	me	behind	my	back.	Here	I	am	harmed	by	their	
attitudes	but	also	by	their	expression.	The	problem	is	not	that	one	col-
league	might	lower	another	colleague’s	opinion	of	my	abilities,	for	my	
colleagues	may	know	perfectly	well	what	 they	all	must	 think	of	me.	
Perhaps	they	have	mocked	me	in	the	past;	perhaps	it	is	simply	obvi-
ous	that	it	is	obvious	to	each	of	them	that	I	am	no	good	at	philosophy.	
Nevertheless,	they	should	refrain	from	public	mockery,	because	I	am	
10.	 It	may	be	that	some	(perhaps	non-human)	persons	have	no	interest	in	what	
others	 think	 of	 them.	 If	 so,	 relationships	 like	 our	 friendship	 and	 acquain-
tanceship	would	not	exist	amongst	them.
whether	or	not	I	(or	anyone	else)	learn	of	it;	the	deeper	their	contempt,	
the	greater	the	injury.	Others	would	feel	a	 little	sorry	for	me	should	
they	learn	of	this,	though,	where	they	think	the	contempt	justified,	this	
sorrow	may	be	replaced	by	a	feeling	of	relief	that	they	are	not	in	my	
place.	Here	they	are	not	merely	glad	that	they	don’t	merit	contempt	
themselves;	 they	 are	 also	 glad	 that	 they	 are	 not	 actually	 despised.	
Once	 I	discover	how	others	 regard	me,	 I’ll	 likely	be	upset,	 and	 that	
upset	will	further	degrade	my	well-being,	but	I’m	upset	here	precisely	
because	I	come	to	realise	that	I	was	already	worse	off	than	I	thought.9
It	is	important	to	this	example	that	the	person	who	despises	me	is	
an	acquaintance.	I	doubt	that	just	anyone’s contempt	makes	my	life	go	
worse.	For	contempt	to	matter,	it	must	occur	in	context	of	a	relationship 
of	 a	 certain	 sort.	 Shared	personhood	 is	 insufficient.	 Perhaps	 certain	
attitudes	matter	 to	me	simply	because	 they	are	held	by	a	 fellow	hu-
man	being.	For	example,	if	someone	is	enjoying	the	sound	of	my	being	
tortured,	that	might	make	the	torture	a	worse	thing	to	happen	to	me,	
whether	or	not	I	am	aware	of	their	delight.	But	most	attitudes	matter	
only	in	the	context	of	some	form	of	social	involvement,	and	how	much	
they	matter	is	a	function	of	whose	attitudes	they	are.	My	house-guest’s	
opinion	 of	my	 choice	 of	 furniture	 counts	 for	 something,	my	 electri-
cian’s	opinion	for	much	 less,	 though	the	 former	may	have	no	better	
taste	than	the	latter.	And	my	friend’s	judgement	that	I	made	a	foolish	
marriage	matters	as	the	judgement	of	a	well-informed	stranger	does	
not,	though	I	remain	oblivious	to	them	both.	
Friendship,	 neighbourliness,	 relations	 of	 hospitality,	 collegiality,	
membership	 in	 a	 team	 or	 joint	 enterprise,	 a	 fiduciary	 relationship	
like	being	someone’s	 lawyer,	even	being	a	 fellow	citizen	can	ensure	
that	someone’s	attitudes	count	for	you.	X’s	attitude	can	still	count	for	
9.	 Those	who	defend	a	purely	experientialist	conception	of	well-being	will	re-
ject	 these	contentions,	but	such	experientialism	has	been	widely	criticized	
(e. g.	 Nagel	 1970:	 76–8	 and	Griffin	 1986:	 13–4).	 Though	 experientialism	 is	
false,	it	may	still	be	that	a	part	of	what	determines	whether	something	is	good	
for	us	is	whether	we	would	enjoy	it	were	we	to	become	aware	of	it.	A	parallel:	
a	red	thing	is	something	that	seems	red	to	us	in	certain	conditions.	Neverthe-
less,	unperceived	things	can	be	red,	and	the	redness	of	a	car	can	explain	why	
we	see	it	as	red.
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benefits	regardless	of	those	wider	effects. You	lead	a	better,	more	suc-
cessful	 life	simply	because	 those	who	matter	 to	you	express	admira-
tion	rather	than	contempt	for	you.12
Note	 that	 expression	 can	 be	 either	 intentional	 or	 unintentional.	
You	can	express	your	contempt	for	me	unintentionally,	e. g.	by	grimac-
ing	whenever	I	am	praised.13	Whether	you	are	aware	of	it	or	not,	you	
are	being	rude.	Your	behaviour	injures	me	over	and	above	the	injury	
constituted	by	the	attitude	it	expresses	and	quite	apart	from	any	pain	
or	 reputational	damage	 caused.	Your	grimaces	 injure	me	 simply	be-
cause	 they	constitute	a	public	display	of	contempt	and	my	 life	goes	
worse	once	I	am	subject	to	such	displays.	
As	already	noted,	there	is	a	crucial	difference	between	public	and	
private	expression.	Say	you	express	your	contempt	for	me	by	writing	
abuse	in	your	secret	diary.	Your	expressing	it	on	paper	adds	little	or	
nothing	to	the	simple	fact	that	you	despise	me.	Should	I	already	know	
that	 you	 despise	me,	 I	won’t	 feel	more	 aggrieved	 just	 because	 you	
wrote	this	down.	Publishing	the	diary	makes	things	a	lot	worse,	simply	
because	your	derision	receives	public	expression.
Much	more	needs	to	be	said	about	the	notions	of	publicity	and	pri-
vacy.	Here	I	confine	myself	to	observing	that	what	counts	as	private	or	
public	expression	will	be	a	function	of	various	factors:	the	relationship	
of	the	parties,	the	topic	of	the	expression,	what	counts	as	normal	be-
haviour	or	a	normal	perceptual	apparatus	in	the	relevant	context	and	
so	forth.	In	particular,	the	privacy	of	an	act	of	expression	is	not	a	simple	
function	of	how	easy	it	is	to	know	about	it.	What	you	say	in	your	own	
living	room	may	count	as	private	even	if	it	is	much	easier	for	the	neigh-
bours	to	learn	of	it	than	of	what	you	have	written	in	some	obscure	pub-
lication.	Civility	has	a	special	subject	matter,	 its	norms	protect	quite	
specific	interests,	it	may	well	draw	the	boundary	between	the	public	
12.	 As	I	am	using	the	term,	expression	is	necessarily	sincere:	one	can’t	express	
feelings	one	doesn’t	actually	have	(Owens	2006:	109).	I	leave	it	open	whether	
insincere	“expressions”	of	an	attitude	can	(in	themselves)	be	harmful	(at	least	
where	the	attitude	they	purport	to	express	would	matter	to	me).	
13.	 Your	grimaces	are	motivated	by	a	desire	to	express	your	attitude	even	though	
this	expression	is	unintentional.
their	colleague.	Once	 I	 learn	of	 their	mockery,	 I	 rightly	 resent	 these	
expressions	of	contempt	and	not	just	the	attitudes	that	they	express.	
And	I	resent	them	because	I’ve	discovered	that	I	am	being	harmed	in	
a	certain	way.	
The	 fact	 that	 the	 expression	 of	 an	 attitude	 has	 its	 own	 (non-epis-
temic)	significance	underlies	a	wide	range	of	social	phenomena.	Con-
sider,	for	example,	the	difference	between	expressing	an	attitude	and	
merely	communicating	it.	 I	may	let	you	(and/or	others)	know	that	 I	
am	angry	with	you	without	expressing	my	anger,	either	to	you	or	to	
anyone	else — for	example,	by	calmly	asking	my	secretary	to	cancel	a	
lunch	appointment	with	you.	Here	you	are	left	in	no	doubt	that	I	am	
angry	(I	am	not	in	the	habit	of	cancelling	appointments),	but	my	tacit	
communication	has	a	quite	different	social	and	emotional	significance	
from	 an	 open	 expression	 of	 annoyance	 like	 an	 exchange	 of	 angry	
words.	I	choose	to	communicate	my	anger	without	expressing	it	pre-
cisely	in	order	to	avoid	inflicting	on	you	a	specific	sort	of	injury,	and	
your	certain	knowledge	that	I	am	annoyed	with	you	is	accompanied	by	
relief	that	you	(and	others)	were	spared	an	open	display	of	my	anger.11
Both	how	an	attitude	and	its	expression	matter	to	me	and	how much 
they	matter	is	a	function	of	many	variables:	the	topic	of	the	attitude,	
the	relationship	between	us,	the	degree	of	publicity	or	privacy	of	the	
expression,	 its	 forcefulness	and	so	 forth.	For	example,	one	might	be	
worse	off	precisely	because	one	is	admired	for	features	that	one	doesn’t	
in	fact	have	or	else	for	features	that	are	not	very	admirable.	And	one	
might	be	better	off	overall	should	one’s	 friend	go	ahead	and	express	
their	 reservations,	 because	 concealing	 them	 would	 have	 tarnished	
our	relationship.	My	only	point	is	that	attitudes	(and	their	expression)	
help	to	determine	how	well	our	lives	are	going	quite	apart	from	the	
further	 consequences	 of	 people	 having	 those	 attitudes	 and	 express-
ing	 them.	 And,	 in	many	 contexts,	 contempt	 harms	 and	 admiration	
11.	 The	difference	between	expression	 and	 communication	 also	 explains	why	
people	are	often	happy	to	imply	(i. e.	communicate)	things	that	they	are	un-
willing	 to	 assert	 (i. e.	 express	 their	 convictions	 about).	 See	 (Owens	 2006:	
106–12).
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matter	of	inhibiting	an	expression	of	disapproval,	the	way	is	open	to	
treating	the	norms	of	toleration	as	a	part	of	our	doctrine	of	civility.	I’ll	
first	characterise	the	subject	matter	of	a	doctrine	of	toleration	and	in	
the	next	section	give	the	grounds	for	it.
A	doctrine	of	toleration	concerns	the	appropriateness	of	(public)	
expressions	of	disapproval.16	To	disapprove	is	at	least	to	judge	that	
someone	wrongfully	thought,	 felt	or	did	something,	and	the	disap-
proval	is	accurate	when	that	judgement	is	correct.17	But	one	can	make	
the	 judgement	 that	 someone	wrongfully	 thought,	 felt	or	did	some-
thing	without	disapproval.	To	disapprove	 is	 to	blame	 the	object	 of	
disapproval,	and	to	blame	someone	involves	more	than	merely	judg-
ing	that	they	did	wrong.	For	instance,	you	may	realise	that	the	wrong	
is	excusable	and	so	blame	 inappropriate.	Nor	can	blame	be	 identi-
fied	with	the	judgement	that	someone	has	done	wrong	without	ex-
cuse.	When	 the	 object	 of	 your	 infatuation	wrongs	 you,	 you	might	
find	yourself	unable	 to	blame	 them	 for	 it,	 though	you	 realise	 they	
have	no	excuse:	you	are	(inwardly)	condoning	what	they	did.	Else-
where	I	contend	that	blame	is	a	form	of	anger	(Owens	2012:	Chapter	
1),	but	here	I	shall	be	assuming	only	that	blame	is	an	attitude	to	the	
wrongdoer	 (qua	wrongdoer)	 that	 goes	beyond	 the	 judgement	 that	
they	did	wrong.
An	action	raises	issues	of	tolerance	in	so	far	as	it	is	motivated	by	a	
desire	to	express	blame	or	disapproval.	Blame	manifests	itself	 in	acts	
of	condemnation,	denunciation,	remonstration,	reproach	and	so	forth.	
Merely	 telling	 someone	 they	did	wrong	 is	often	a	 reproach	but	not	
always.	For	 instance,	moral	educators	may	be	wary	of	 the	 tone	 they	
16.	 Can	adverse	feelings	be	intolerant	as	well	as	harmful	even	where	you	reliably	
suppress	them?	I’m	unsure.	Here	I’ll	focus	on	expression.
17.	 There	is	such	a	thing	as	visceral	aversion,	a	feeling	not	based	on	the	judge-
ment	that	there	is	anything	wrong	with	its	object.	Couldn’t	I	be	called	upon	
to	tolerate	broccoli	simply	because	it	disgusts	me	and	regardless	of	whether	
I	disapprove	of	it?	I	might	feel	a	similar	sort	of	antagonism	towards	certain	
people,	perhaps	because	of	their	race.	Isn’t	this	also	an	occasion	for	tolera-
tion	(Raz	1986:	402–3)?	Perhaps	so:	it	certainly	raises	issues	of	civility.	For	
present	 purposes	 I	 restrict	myself	 to	 toleration	 that	 involves	 disapproval	
and	its	suppression.
and	the	private	realm	in	its	own	way,	and	we	should	not	assimilate	its	
rules	and	notions	to	others	that	respond	to	different	concerns.14
In	this	section	I	have	not	tried	to	formulate	a	detailed	doctrine	of	
civility,	only	tried	to	make	it	seem	plausible	that	there	are	autonomous	
norms	of	civility.	My	claims	about	the	bearing	of	expression	on	human	
interests	and	well-being	may	well	be	denied.15	I	have	supported	them	
by	noting	the	sorrow	(for	someone	else)	and	the	regret	(for	oneself)	
we	 typically	 feel	 at	 the	 public	 expression	 of	 unfavourable	 attitudes	
(and	regardless	of	 the	 further	consequences	of	 such	expression).	At	
least	where	 there	 are	no	 countervailing	demands	on	our	 emotional	
attention,	sorrow	and	regret	seem	perfectly	apt.	They	reflect	the	idea	
that	how	well	our	lives	are	going	is	not	just	a	function	of	our	subjective	
state	or	of	the	success	of	our	(worthwhile)	plans	and	projects;	it	is	also	
a	function	of	how	the	people	around	us	regard	us,	even	where	their	re-
actions	do	not	otherwise	impinge	on	our	states,	plans	and	projects.	No	
doubt	the	feelings	of	sorrow	and	regret	to	which	I	have	drawn	atten-
tion	can,	in	one	way	or	another,	be	explained	away.	But	in	the	absence	
of	a	convincing	general	theory	of	human	well-being	that	renders	them	
groundless,	I	shall	take	appearances	at	face	value	and	assume	that	the	
public	 expression	of	one’s	 attitude	 towards	 another	person	 can	pos-
sess	a	significance	of	its	own.
2. Tolerance
With	the	outlines	of	a	doctrine	of	civility	before	us,	let’s	treat	toleration	
as	an	instance	of	civility.	Toleration	is	called	for	by	acts,	attitudes	and	
practices	that	are	otherwise	occasions	for	disapproval.	To	tolerate	the	
neighbour’s	 loud	music,	a	colleague’s	unpunctuality	or	your	grandfa-
ther’s	racism	is	to	suppress	your	disapproval	of	these	things	(Raz	1986	
403,	 Scanlon	 2003:	 187,	Walsham	2006:	 4).	Where	 suppression	 is	 a	
14.	 For	example,	 compare	 the	notion	of	publicity	employed	 in	our	doctrine	of	
civility	with	that	needed	to	formulate	rules	of	public	decency	(Elias	2000:	Part	
2).	They	seem	related	but	not	identical.	A fortiori	for	the	notions	of	the	public	
sphere,	public	justification	and	so	forth	that	appear	in	liberal	doctrines	of	ac-
commodation	(Rawls	1999).
15.	 “Sticks	and	stones	will	break	my	bones	but	words	will	never	harm	me.”
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judgements	but	choice	does	not	raise	issues	of	toleration	unless	it	ex-
presses	disapproval.19
If	my	characterisation	of	tolerance	is	correct,	candidates	for	tolera-
tion	include	any	act,	attitude	or	practice	that	could	be	seen	as	wrong	or	
blameworthy.20	You	can	tolerate	a	wrong	regardless	of	who	is	wronged	
by	 the	wrong;	 indeed	you	can	tolerate	victimless	crimes	 that	wrong	
nobody.	Stock	examples	of	toleration	involve	a	disagreement	in	nor-
mative	judgement	between	the	tolerator	and	the	tolerated,	but,	as	we	
shall	see,	this	is	inessential	to	toleration.	The	tolerated	party	may	ac-
cept	the	very	norm	they	violate.21 
I	place	the	following	restriction	(perhaps	stipulative)	on	the	scope	
of	 ‘disapproval’:	 a	 disapproving	 attitude	 must	 matter	 to	 the	 object	
of	disapproval.	Disapproval is blame which counts.	The	motivation	 for	
this	 restriction	 is	 that	an	attitude	must	count	 in	order	 for	 its	expres-
sion	to	raise	issues	of	civility	and	toleration.	Only	if	an	attitude	counts	
does	the	(mere)	expression	of	it	constitute	an	injury.	For	example,	my	
friends	can	disapprove	of	my	marriage,	because	it	matters	to	me	what	
my	friends	think.	They	can	also	tolerate	it	(or	not)	as	they	see	fit	and	
thereby	avoid	inflicting	the	injury	of	expressing	their	disapproval.	By	
contrast,	I	am	in	no	position	to	tolerate	Hillary	Clinton’s	choice	of	mar-
riage	partner	in	so	far	as	my	attitude	and	its	expression	leave	her	in-
terests	unaffected.
An	 important	 feature	of	urban	 life	 is	 the	degree	of	 social	 integra-
tion	it	requires,	and	opportunities	for	both	tolerance	and	intolerance	
multiply	once	we	share	our	social	space	with	many	others.	For	those	
who	live	in	isolated	villages	or	ghettos	and	rarely	come	into	contact	
19.	 The	merits	 of	 hate-crime	 legislation	 are	 debatable,	 but	 victims	 do	 have	 a	
specific	interest	in	whether	the	assault	they	suffer	expresses	a	disapproving	
attitude.	
20.	We	also	speak	of	tolerating	groups	(e. g.	Catholics)	or	individuals	(e. g.	one’s	
son-in-law),	but	this	is	shorthand	for	toleration	of	their	perceived	faults.	Of	
course,	the	grounds of	toleration	may	concern	the	status	of	the	individual	or	
group	quite	as	much	as	the	nature	of	their	fault,	but	that	is	another	matter.
21.	 Thus	one	can	tolerate	(or	condone)	one’s	own	faults,	provided	apt	suppres-
sion	of	self-disapproval	is	a	possibility.	
adopt	lest	they	add	the	injury	of	remonstration	to	the	distress	caused	
by	the	revelation	that	they	judge	their	charges	to	have	done	wrong.
Earlier	I	highlighted	the	difference	between	expressing	your	anger	
to	someone	and	merely	communicating	the	fact	that	you	are	angry. A 
relationship	can	often	survive	shared	knowledge	of	the	fact	that	one	
party	is	angry	with	the	other	even	when	it	would	be	unable	to	survive	
an	open	expression	of	anger.18	The	same	applies	to	disapproval	(Nagel	
1998:	14–6).	Friendship	may	oblige	you	not	to	bring	your	disapproval	
of	what	 I’ve	done	out	 into	 the	open	(either	between	us	or	between	
yourself	and	a	 third	party)	without	preventing	you	 from	tacitly	com-
municating	that	disapproval	to	me	(or	another).	A	friend	may	feel	able	
to	let	me	know	that	he	disapproves	of	my	meat	eating	without	openly	
expressing	his	indignation.
Disapproval	 concerns	wrongs.	 I	 can	 judge	 that	 someone	 is	 think-
ing	or	doing	the	wrong	thing	without	judging	that	they	are	thinking	
or	doing	anything	wrongful	or	blameworthy,	i. e.	committing	a	wrong.	
(In	political	debates	about	the	relative	priority	of	education	and	health	
care,	I	may	regard	my	opponents	as	mistaken,	but	I	won’t	disapprove	
of	their	erroneous	beliefs	unless	I	also	think	them	unreasonable	in	an	
inexcusable	way).	Disapproval	deploys	the	notion	of	a	wrong:	merely	
giving	something	a	low	grade	or	valuing	it	less	than	other	things	is	not	
to	disapprove	of	it.	One	can	regard	some	acts,	attitudes	and	practices	
as	worth	 less	 than	others	 (or	even	hold	 them	 in	contempt)	without	
thinking	of	them	as	wrongful	or	blameworthy.	If	I	let	my	employees	off	
for	Christian	but	not	for	Muslim	festivals,	that	may	be	invidious,	but	it	
is	not	intolerant	unless	my	so	doing	is	an	expression	of	the	view	that	
it	 is	wrong	to	observe	Muslim	holidays.	Choice	often	requires	value	
18.	 On	my	view,	we	can	explain why	your	expression	of	anger	at	me	has	a	greater	
psychological	impact	on	me	than	would	mere	communication	of	the	fact	that	
you	are	angry	with	me.	Expression	(whether	or	not	I	am	aware	of	it)	harms	
me	in	a	way	that	communication	does	not.	Thus	to	become	aware	of	the	fact	
that	someone	is	expressing	anger	about	me	is	to	become	aware	of	the	fact	
that	I	am	being	harmed	in	this	special	way.
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norms	of	toleration,	norms	regulating	the	expression	of	disapproval.	
But	before	investigating	their	grounds,	I	shall	wrap	up	this	section	by	
distinguishing	toleration	from	certain	social	phenomena	that	are	eas-
ily	confused	with	it.
The	standard	story	of	the	rise	of	toleration	since	the	Reformation	
begins	with	people	who	tolerated	one	another	because	the	alternative	
was	an	open-ended	religious	war.	This	is	toleration	motivated	by	fear	
of	the	further	consequences	of	a	failure	to	tolerate.	What	I’d	call	genu-
ine	(religious)	toleration	is	toleration	motivated	by	the	thought	that	it	
is	often	intrinsically	appropriate	to	refrain	from	expressing	your	disap-
proval	of	the	religion	of	another,	either	in	fighting	words	or	in	actual	
fighting.23	The	latter	idea	is	easily	confused	with	some	rather	different	
ideas	that	took	hold	around	the	same	time.24	We	must	distinguish	the	
rise	of	tolerance	from	the	decline	of	intolerance.
Recent	social	history	is	in	part	a	story	about	how	the	preconditions	
of	intolerance	are	less	frequently	satisfied	than	they	once	were.	For	ex-
ample,	some	of	what	is	called	religious	tolerance	is	in	fact	a	product	of	
religious	indifference	or	religious	scepticism.	You	are	in	a	position	to	
disapprove	of	others	for	wrongfully	adhering	to	an	erroneous	religion	
only	if	you	think	that	there	are	religious	truths	and	that	we	have	some	
idea	what	 they	 are.	 The	 rise	 of	 religious	 pluralism	 and	 agnosticism	
cuts	 intolerance	 off	 at	 its	 source	 by	 dissolving	 doctrinal	 differences.	
Still	 it	 is	 confusing	 to	describe	 this	 as	a	 form	of	 religious	 toleration.	
Once	religious	differences	have	disappeared,	the	opportunity	to	toler-
ate	people	of	different	faiths	has	gone	with	it.
23.	 In	this	paper,	I	use	‘intrinsic’	simply	to	mean	‘non-instrumental’,	so	‘intrinsi-
cally	valuable’	means	‘non-instrumentally	valuable’	or	 ‘valuable	for	its	own	
sake’.
24.	 Recent	historiography	of	 the	 rise	of	 religious	 toleration	 in	Europe	has	cast	
doubt	on	the	idea	that	liberal	notions	of	accommodation	played	a	major	role	
in	the	social	and	political	life	of	the	Early	Modern	period	(e. g.	Kaplan	2007:	
8	and	Walsham	2006:	228–47).	These	doubts	may	be	well-founded.	What	I 
call	genuine	tolerance	is	an	element	in	a	range	of	relationships	—	friendship,	
hospitality,	neighborliness	etc.	—	that	surely	did	exist	in	the	Early	Modern	pe-
riod	(as	these	very	writers	emphasize)	and	which	were,	for	that	very	reason,	
regarded	with	suspicion	by	the	agents	of	intolerance.	
with	the	wider	world,	 the	attitudes	of	 that	world	will	count	 for	very	
little.	The	life	of	their	community	would	be	no	less	successful	simply	
because	the	rest	of	the	world	happened	to	disapprove	of	what	went	
on	 in	 it.	 But	 once	 the	 inhabitants	 start	 to	 form	 commercial	 connec-
tions,	make	friends,	entertain	outsiders	as	guests	and	so	forth,	this	all	
changes.	Both	tolerance	and	intolerance	become	real	options.	
In	the	last	section	I	claimed	that	the	public	expression	of	an	unfa-
vourable	attitude	could	matter	to	me	whether	or	not	it	is	addressed	to	
me	and	whether	or	not	I	am	even	aware	of	it.	Clearly	expressions	of	
intolerance	need	not	be	addressed	to	me	and	might	occur	behind	my	
back.	Homophobic	abuse	is	no	less	intolerant	just	because	the	abuser	
keeps	it	for	the	ears	of	presumed	heterosexuals.22	Even	the	expression	
of	baseless	attitudes	can	constitute	an	injury,	and	the	same	is	true	of	
disapproval.	Those	who	 regard	condemnations	of	homosexuality	as	
baseless	do	not,	 for	 that	 reason,	 regard	 them	as	any	 the	 less	 intoler-
ant,	and,	 if	 I	 am	right,	 that	 is	because	baselessness	does	not	 render	
them	harmless.	King	James	I’s	life	went	worse	simply	because	he	was	
surrounded	 by	 courtiers	 who	 denounced	 his	 homosexual	 liaisons.	
Though	James	was	harmed	in	no	other	way,	we	might	 feel	sorry	 for	
him	on	this	point	at	least.
In	the	next	section,	I’ll	examine	the	grounds	of	toleration.	There	
are	 various	 reasons	 why	 one	might	 suppress	 expressions	 of	 disap-
proval.	Some	depend	on	their	undesirable	further	consequences,	e. g.	
the	defensive	reactions	of	their	object	or	the	great	suffering	you	might	
cause	them.	Others	have	to	do	with	the	merits	of	the	attitude	of	disap-
proval:	expression	of	it	may	be	inappropriate	because	the	attitude	is	
itself	inappropriate.	I’ve	proposed	that	there	are	autonomous	norms	
of	civility,	norms	which	govern	the	expressions	of	attitudes	and	which	
cannot	be	reduced	to	those	governing	the	attitudes	themselves,	nor	
to	those	concerned	with	the	adequacy	of	their	expression	or	 its	 fur-
ther	consequences.	Among	 these	norms	of	 civility	are	autonomous	
22.	 The	idea	that	expressions	of	intolerance	must	be	addressed	to	the	object	of	
disapproval	would	make	sense	only	if	you	thought	that	the	point	of	intolerant	
behavior	was	to	discourage	the	thing	you	disapprove	of.
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interaction	of	 several	 values,	 of	which	 the	 value	of	 disapproval-sup-
pression	is	only	one.	
There	 is	 a	 foundational	 issue	 here:	 how	 could	 it	 ever	 be	 intrinsi-
cally	appropriate	 (or	even	obligatory)	 to	 suppress	 the	expression	of	
a	disapproval	that	is	perfectly	accurate?	Of	course,	there	are	endless	
reasons	why	it	might	be	a	good	idea	to	refrain	from	expressing	a	well-
founded	attitude	or	reaction,	all	things	considered.	But	if	disapproval	
is	called	 for	and	 the	heavens	will	not	 fall	 should	you	say	so,	why	 is	
there	any	virtue	or	even	sense	in	refraining	from	expressing	it?	Schef-
fler	calls	this	“the	paradox	of	suppressed	disapproval”	(Scheffler	2010:	
316).	This	worry	is	more	pressing	if	we	think	(as	do	I)	that	one	who	
disapproves	has	some	reason	 to	express	 their	disapproval	simply	 in	
virtue	of	(accurately)	disapproving,	that	the	expression	of	accurate	dis-
approval	has	some	value.
In	previous	sections,	I	have	argued	that	the	expression	of	emotions	
like	 contempt	 and	 disapproval	 can	 itself constitute	 a	 harm	 to	 their	
object	(namely	where	you	are	dealing	with	a	friend	etc.)	quite	apart	
from	the	further	consequences	of	that	expression.	Taking	this	point	to	
have	been	established,	 it	 follows	 that	 the	suppression	of	 these	emo-
tions	would	 in itself	be	a	benefit	to	their	object,	quite	apart	from	the	
further	consequences	of	that	suppression.	Given	this,	it	is	no	surprise	
to	discover	that	the	non-expression	of	disapproval	is,	in	many	circum-
stances,	intrinsically	appropriate.	Indeed,	in	the	case	of	a	friend	(etc.)	
it	may	be	a	benefit	one	is	obliged	to	bestow	on	them.	Thus	the	value	of	
suppression	can	be	 (at	 least	 in	part)	non-instrumental	 (i. e.	 indepen-
dent	of	the	further	consequences	of	suppression).	The	absence	of	the	
harm	of	disapproval-expression	 is	not	 a	 further	 consequence	of	 the	
suppression	of	disapproval,	is	not	a	desirable	effect	brought	about	by	
suppression;	rather,	successful	suppression	just is	that	absence	and	so	
immediately	confers	the	benefit	of	that	absence.
That	 is	my	 resolution	of	Scheffler’s	paradox,	but	we	 still	need	 to	
understand	precisely	how	the	norms	of	tolerance	arise	from	the	non-
instrumental	value	of	the	suppression	of	disapproval.	Before	proceed-
ing,	we	should	note	a	feature	of	human	life	crucial	for	our	purposes,	
The	success	of	the	humanitarian	movement	also	undermined	intol-
erance	by	removing	the	preconditions	for	the	attitude	of	disapproval	
which	intolerance	requires.	Disapproval	is	inappropriate	when	the	ob-
ject	of	your	disapproval	has	a	good	excuse	for	what	they	have	done,	
and	 humanitarian	 thinking	 uncovered	 new	 and	 varied	 forms	 of	 ex-
cuse.	Prior	to	the	Second	World	War,	many	soldiers	who	would	now	
be	treated	for	shell	shock	or	battle	fatigue	were	shot	for	cowardice	in	
the	face	of	the	enemy.	I	doubt	this	change	is	best	described	as	the	mili-
tary	 coming	 to	 tolerate	desertion;	 certainly	 that	 is	not	how	 the	mili-
tary	would	describe	it.	Rather	this	is	a	case	of	their	earlier	intolerance	
(i. e.	 the	 violent	 expression	of	 their	disapproval	 of	 cowardice)	being	
undermined	because	the	attitude	of	disapproval	that	the	intolerance	
expressed	has	been	shown	to	be	inappropriate.	The	victory	of	psycho-
logical	determinism	would	not	usher	in	an	era	of	tolerance	any	more	
than	the	triumph	of	moral	scepticism.
So	how	can	the	suppression	of	accurate	disapproval	be	intrinsically	
apt?	How	is	such	a	tolerant	attitude	to	be	justified?	In	the	next	section,	
I’ll	address	these	questions	by	considering	certain	relationships	within	
which	toleration	is	apt	and	even	obligatory.
3. Tolerance and Relationships
It	 is	 often	appropriate	 to	 suppress	one’s	disapproval	of	wrongdoing,	
to	fail	to	give	one’s	disapproval	public	expression.	I’m	calling	the	apt	
suppression	of	disapproval	toleration.25	Of	course	people	can	so	refrain	
when	 an	 expression	 of	 disapproval	 is	 appropriate	 or	 even	 required.	
Call	 that	 condonation.	 The	 expression	 of	 disapproval	 when	 suppres-
sion	is	apt	or	obligatory	is	intolerance.	The	norms	of	toleration	tell	us	
when	we	should	suppress	our	disapproval,	but	they	also	tell	us	when	
we	should	do	the	opposite,	when	tolerance	would	amount	to	condo-
nation.	As	we	shall	see,	the	norms	of	toleration	are	the	product	of	the	
25.	 This	stipulation	implies	that	tolerance	is	never	inappropriate.	This	may	not	fit	
contemporary	usage	(e. g.	‘you	ought	not	to	tolerate	that’),	let	alone	that	of	a	
previous	age	when	‘toleration’	was	often	a	pejorative	term	(Walsham	2006:	
4–5,	228–9).	Nevertheless,	since	it	is	the	phenomenon	of	apt	toleration	that	
raises	the	difficult	issues,	the	stipulation	is	useful	for	my	purposes.
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to	see	more	of	one’s	friends.	The	need	for	tolerance	is	created	by	the	
ubiquity	of	accurate	disapproval	(whatever	its	source)	when	combined	
with	the	fact	of	social	integration.	Friends,	for	instance,	are	meant	to	
have	a	special	care	for	the	interests	of	their	friends,	but	by	making	a	
friend,	you	render	each	other	especially	vulnerable	to	a	certain	kind	
of	harm,	namely	disapproval.	Relations	of	hospitality,	neighbourliness	
and	even	acquaintanceship	also	involve	a	concern,	albeit	a	narrower	
one,	for	the	interests	of	the	other,	and	these	relationships	create	a	simi-
lar	vulnerability.	
By	becoming	Tom’s	friend,	you	ensure	that	Tom’s	character	matters	
to	you	in	a	way	it	otherwise	wouldn’t	and	that	your	disapproval	mat-
ters	to	Tom	in	a	way	it	otherwise	wouldn’t.	Suppose	Tom	cheats	on	his	
taxes	and	you	learn	of	this.	Were	Tom	a	stranger	whom	you	read	about	
in	a	newspaper,	you	could	freely	speak	your	mind	or	forget	the	whole	
thing	as	you	prefer.	But	when	Tom	is	your	friend	it	is	hard	to	avoid	tak-
ing	a	view,	a	view	whose	expression	will	be	of	special	significance	for	
Tom.	And	it	will	be	equally	hard	to	avoid	occasions	when	it	would	(the	
need	 for	 tolerance	aside)	be	pertinent	 to	express	your	view	 to	Tom	
or	someone	else.	In	sum,	it	looks	as	if	your	friendship	for	Tom	places	
you	under	conflicting	normative	pressures.	On	the	one	hand,	you	are	
meant	 to	have	a	special	care	 for	Tom’s	 interests	 (though	not	 for	 the	
stranger’s).	On	the	other	hand,	you	can’t	simply	ignore	Tom’s	vices	as	
you	might	those	of	a	stranger.28
How	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 conflict	 created	 by	 Tom’s	 wrongdoing?	 If	
Tom	has	wronged	me,	I	can	forgive	him,	and	having	forgiven	Tom	for	
what	he	did,	it	is	no	longer	appropriate	for	me	to	express	disapproval,	
either	 to	Tom	or	 to	 anyone	 else.	 Indeed	 it	 is	 no	 longer	 appropriate	
for	me	 to	 feel	 disapproval	 (though	 I	 continue	 to	believe	 that	he	did	
wrong).29	Various	things	may	be	necessary	to	render	forgiveness	apt,	
but	being	inclined	to	forgive	is	considered	a	virtue,	particularly	within	
28.	There	is	no	virtue	of	suppressing	apt	approval	within	friendship,	because	no	
systematic	conflict	of	values	is	involved,	though	it	may	be	right	not	to	express	
approval	on	a	particular	occasion.	
29.	For	a	more	detailed	account	of	forgiveness,	see	(Owens	2012:	51–61).
namely	the ubiquity of accurate disapproval.	One	thing	that	creates	the	
need	 for	 tolerance	 is	 the	presence	of	 significant	normative	disagree-
ment.26	Normative	dissent,	 like	 that	between	the	carnivores	and	the	
vegetarians,	 creates	a	 situation	 in	which	each	party	 feels	 entitled	 to	
disapprove	 of	 the	 other,	 and	 so	 the	 need	 for	 tolerance	 increases	 in	
an	era	of	pervasive	disagreement	like	our	own.	But	tolerance	is	also	
required	whenever	 there	 is	 (or	appears	 to	be)	widespread	wrongdo-
ing,	and	that	may	be	anticipated	even	in	the	presence	of	a	strong	con-
sensus	on	normative	issues.	Any	plausible	human	morality	will	set	its	
face	against	certain	familiar	temptations,	temptations	many	of	us	suc-
cumb	to	on	a	regular	basis.	We	are	inconsiderate,	impatient,	irascible,	
or	simply	irresolute	in	varying	degrees,	and	these	character	traits	do	
not	excuse	us.	Nor	are	they	likely	to	be	eliminated	anytime	soon.	The	
prevalence	of	vice	creates	occasions	for	toleration	even	where	the	list	
of	vices	is	generally	agreed	upon.27
As	we	have	seen,	disapproval	counts	in	the	context	of	relationships,	
and	the	more	intimate	the	relationship,	the	more	it	counts.	We	should	
not	imagine	that	a	valuable	intimacy	necessarily	lowers	the	chances	
of	accurate	disapproval.	No	plausible	ideal	of	friendship	requires	one	
to	befriend	only	saints	(or	those	one	regards	as	such).	Nor	are	we	re-
quired	to	avoid	partying	with	sinners	or	becoming	their	neighbours,	
let	alone	their	relatives.	Even	if	one	has	good	taste	 in	 friends,	disap-
proval	will	be	accurate	at	least	as	often	with	one’s	friends	as	with	one’s	
acquaintances,	fellow	citizens	and	so	forth,	if	only	because	one	tends	
26.	Rawls	claims	that	persistent	and	profound	normative	differences	are	“the	in-
evitable	long-run	result	of	the	powers	of	human	reason	at	work	within	the	
background	of	enduring	free	institutions”	(Rawls	1999:	4).	See	also	(Scheffler	
2010:	323).
27.	 So	a	 stable	 society	 facing	widespread	normative	disagreement	 for	 the	first	
time	may	already	have	resources	to	deal	with	it.	This	is	another	theme	of	the	
recent	historiography	of	the	Reformation	(Walsham	2006:	207–12,	269–80;	
Kaplan	2006:	Chapter	9),	though	other	historians	of	the	Early	Modern	period	
are	more	pessimistic	(Elias	2000:	161–72).	 It	 is	worth	asking	how	far	these	
prosaic	 notions	 can	 take	 us	 before	we	 resort	 to	 “higher-order	 impartiality”	
between	different	moral	conceptions	(Nagel	1991:	155)	and	other	distinctive	
products	of	liberal	theory.
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against	others,	 it	 is	 frequently	apt	 for	me	 to	 refrain	 from	expressing	
disapproval	of	how	my	friend	or	my	fellow	guest	has	behaved	towards	
a	 third	party.	 I	 shouldn’t	 take	up	 the	cudgels	on	another’s	behalf	 re-
gardless	of	the	injury	I	inflict,	and	the	rules	of	tolerance	tell	me	when	it	
is	appropriate	for	me	to	hold	back.	As	to	ongoing	wrongdoing	(wheth-
er	against	ourselves	or	another),	our	friends’	vices	or	our	neighbours’	
are	just	the	sort	of	thing	we	are	called	upon	to	tolerate.	Disapproval	
of	their	vices	(e. g.	of	their	insensitivity)	may	still	be	apt,	and	tolerance	
does	not	mean	ceasing	to	disapprove;	 it	entails	only	 that	we	refrain	
from	regularly	expressing	our	disapproval.32 
Where	 wrongdoing	 occurs	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 relationship	 that	
gives	disapproval	a	special	significance,	tolerance	is	often	not	merely	
apt	but	actually	required	of	us	(e. g.	it	might	be	wrong	to	tell	a	stranger	
that	 you	 resent	 your	 friend’s	 insensitivity).	 Nevertheless,	 friendship	
(for	 instance)	does	not	oblige	us	 to	 tolerate	every	wrong,	any	more	
than	to	forgive	it;	friendship	does	not	mandate	a	general	suppression	
of	disapproval,	or	even	render	it	appropriate.	Many	expressions	of	dis-
approval	are	too	trivial	to	worry	about.	Others	may	be	required	of	us	
by	the	heinous	nature	of	the	wrong:	letting	it	pass	without	comment	
would	be	to	condone	it.	In	yet	other	cases,	tolerance	has	genuine	value	
but	this	value	is	outweighed	by	further	considerations.	Perhaps	a	well-
timed	 expression	 of	 disapproval	might	 exercise	 an	 improving	 influ-
ence,	outweighing	the	harm	done	by	the	expression,	and	so	you	may	
inflict	the	harm	of	disapproval	out	of	friendship.	And	sometimes	you	
shouldn’t	conceal	how	strongly	you	feel	about	the	wrong	your	friend	
has	done,	because	friendship	itself	requires	a	certain	kind	of	openness.	
My	point	 is	only	that	 friendship	(and	other	relationships),	by	giving	
disapproval	 a	 certain	 significance,	 thereby	 change	when	 it	 is	 apt	 to	
express	it,	and	frequently	they	make	disapproval	inapt	by	rendering	it	
more	harmful.	The	norms	of	tolerance	tell	us	when	this	is	so.33 
32.	 Since	giving	one’s	disapproval	expression	is	an	injury	over	and	above	merely	
feeling	it,	tolerance	reduces	the	harm	without	eliminating	it	altogether.
33.	 Different	 cultures	 weigh	 differently	 the	 competing	 values	 of	 sincerity,	
openness,	moral	 improvement	 and	 the	avoidance	of	public	 expressions	of	
relationships	like	friendship;	one	may	even	be	obliged	to	forgive	one’s	
friend.	This,	I	suggest,	is	because	forgiveness	resolves	a	conflict	which	
friendship	creates	for	us.	
Talk	of	“resolving	conflict”	might	make	it	sound	as	if	I	am	attribut-
ing	an	instrumental	value	to	forgiveness,	but	the	conflict	here	is	not	
an	undesirable	outcome	(like	disruption	of	the	friendship)30	which	for-
giveness	pre-empts;	rather	it	is	a	logical	tension	between	values.	The	
values	in	tension	each	contribute	to	the	distinctive	value	of	friendship.	
First,	there	is	the	special	care	that	friends	have	for	the	interests	of	their	
friends.	Second,	 there	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 friendship	ensures	 that	 the	ac-
tions	and	attitudes	of	your	friends	matter	(to	you)	more	than	those	of	a	
stranger.31	Given	the	ubiquity	of	the	occasions	for	accurate	disapprov-
al,	these	values	pull	us	in	different	directions,	the	former	discouraging	
the	disapproval	whilst	the	latter	encourages	it.	The	norms	governing	
the	 appropriateness	 of	 forgiveness	 strike	 a	 balance	 between	 these	
competing	claims,	 telling	us	how	 to	 regulate	our	disapproval	 in	 the	
light	of	 them.	The	norms	of	 forgiveness	thereby	integrate	the	poten-
tially	conflicting	values	characteristic	of	friendship,	saying	how	a	true	
friend	would	react	to	the	situation. 
Though	forgiveness	is	usually	more	welcome	than	toleration,	two	
features	 of	 forgiveness	 limit	 its	 scope.	 First,	 forgiveness	 is	 problem-
atic	whenever	the	wrong	is	 likely	to	be	repeated,	either	because	the	
wrong	manifests	an	ingrained	vice	or	else	because	it	reflects	persisting	
circumstances	that	make	it	tempting.	By	ceasing	to	disapprove	of	an	
ongoing	wrong,	you	are	in	danger	of	condoning	it,	of	failing	to	take	it	
seriously,	of	being	more	crony	than	friend.	Second,	you	can	generally	
forgive	only	wrongs	done	to	yourself.	I’m	not	in	a	position	to	forgive	
Tom	for	fiddling	his	taxes,	nor	for	being	rude	to	his	partner.	In	both	
respects,	 tolerance	 is	 more	 flexible	 than	 forgiveness.	 As	 to	 wrongs	
30.	So	long	as	Tom	remains	unaware	that	I	disapprove	of	his	not	paying	his	taxes,	
our	friendship	may	not	be	disrupted	at	all.	
31.	 The	 role	 of	 friendship	 (etc.)	 in	 the	 argument	 is	 to	 provide	 one	 context	 in	
which	emotions	and	their	expression	matter	for	their	own	sake.	Friendship	is	
not	playing	the	role	of	a	good	that	is	preserved	or	protected	by	tolerance.	That	
would	give	tolerance	only	an	instrumental	value.	
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an	issue.	Still	a	public	condemnation	probably	isn’t	appropriate,	even	
setting	collateral	damage	aside,	because	it	involves	inflicting	an	injury	
on	your	friend.	Should	your	friend	unexpectedly	learn	of	your	expres-
sion	of	disapproval,	they’ll	be	hurt,	not	just	by	the	fact	of	your	disap-
proval	 but	 also	by	 your	public	 condemnation.	They	may	well	 think	
that	loyalty	should	at	least	have	led	you	to	suppress	your	disapproval	
and	thereby	avoided	inflicting	a	further	injury	on	them.	This	all	makes	
sense	once	we	acknowledge	that	your	friend	has	an	interest	in	your	
attitude	and	 its	 expression.	And	 surely	one	 intrinsically	valuable	as-
pect	of	friendship	is	the	concern	you	have	for	your	friend’s	interests,	so	
someone	who	values	friendship	correctly	should	regard	the	tolerance	
it	 requires	of	 them	as	part	of	what	gives	 that	 friendship	 its	value.	A	
good	friend	can	aptly	regret	that	they	must	“put	up”	with	their	friend’s	
vices	and	weaknesses	(or	else	that	they	must	forgive	them),	but	what	
is	regretted	here	are	the	vices	and	weaknesses	themselves	and	the	ex-
penditure	of	energy	required	to	suppress	accurate	disapproval	of	them.	
What	should	not	be	regretted	is	the	normative	fact	that	the	friendship	
requires	you	 to	 tolerate	or	 forgive	 things	 that	you	wouldn’t	need	 to	
tolerate	or	forgive	in	a	stranger.	
4. Conclusion: Illiberal Tolerance?
A	doctrine	of	civility	tells	us	when	it	is	appropriate	to	give	public	ex-
pression	 to	 interpersonal	 attitudes.	 In	 the	 first	 section,	 I	 sought	 to	
ground	a	doctrine	of	civility	 in	 the	 idea	 that	such	expression	affects	
our	well-being.	 In	particular,	 the	expression	of	an	unfavourable	atti-
tude	constitutes	an	 injury	to	 its	object,	at	 least	 in	 the	context	of	cer-
tain	relationships.	I	then	characterised	a	doctrine	of	toleration	as	a	set	
of	rules	about	when	the	expression	of	disapproval	is	appropriate	and	
suggested	that	a	doctrine	of	toleration	can	be	based	on	the	incivility	of	
the	public	expression	of	disapproval,	on	the	fact	that	such	expression	
harms	its	object.	In	the	third	section,	I	noted	that	various	relationships	
constrain	 the	 expression	 of	 disapproval	 in	 a	way	 best	 explained	 by	
supposing	that	such	expression	would	injure	your	friend,	neighbour	
I	have	not	been	arguing	that	tolerance	is	of	value	because	it	keeps	
the	peace	between	friends	or	brings	about	some	other	desirable	out-
come.	Still	 tolerance	often	does	possess	these	forms	of	 instrumental	
value.	Might	it	instead	be	maintained	that	the	value	of	tolerance	is	in	
fact	purely	 instrumental,	 a	mere	 reflection	of	 the	 independent	value	
of	the	relationships	that	it	facilitates	(Hobbes	1994:	96)?	Perhaps	tol-
erating	your	friend	is	just	a	matter	of	suppressing	a	disapproval	that	
threatens	to	disrupt	this	intrinsically	valuable	relationship.	When	your	
friend	has	behaved	badly,	you	may	have	to	hold	your	tongue	for	the	
sake	of	the	friendship,	but,	the	objection	goes,	that	is	not	a	valuable	
aspect	of	the	friendship.	Apt	toleration	is	a	buffer	against	forces	that	
threaten	to	disrupt	a	relationship	valuable	for	quite	other	reasons.
Something	 like	 this	 may	 be	 true	 of	 tolerance	 between	 business	
partners.	Writing	of	the	London	Stock	Exchange	in	the	1720s,	Voltaire	
observes	that	
Here	 Jew,	Mohammedan	 and	 Christian	 deal	 with	 each	
other	as	though	they	were	all	of	the	same	faith,	and	only	
apply	the	word	infidel	to	people	who	go	bankrupt.	Here	
the	Presbyterian	trusts	the	Anabaptist	and	the	Anglican	
accepts	a	promise	from	the	Quaker	(Voltaire	1980:	41)	
Perhaps	we	wouldn’t	 be	missing	 anything	 if	we	 regarded	 such	 sup-
pression	of	disapproval	simply	as	a	way	of	avoiding	disruption	to	the	
free	flow	of	trade	and	the	trust	that	it	requires.	That	might	be	so	even	if	
one	also	regarded	these	trusting	relations	as	intrinsically	valuable,	not	
just	as	useful	instruments	of	commercial	exchange.	The	tolerance	they	
require	may	still	be	a	facilitator	of	these	trusting	relationships	and	not	
something	which	itself	contributes	to	their	value.
Now	consider	friendship.	Perhaps	you	happen	to	know	your	friend	
won’t	learn	of	your	disapproval	and	so	damage	to	the	friendship	is	not	
disapproval.	 Compare	 Japan	 and	 Israel.	 I	 doubt	 there	 are	 universal	 truths	
about	 exactly	 how	much	 tolerance	 should	 be	 valued,	 but	 I	 find	 it	 hard	 to	
imagine	a	human	society	that	would	regard	the	public	expression	of	disap-
proval	with	complete	indifference.	
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or	conversational	partner.	I	thereby	made	a	case	for	the	intrinsic	value	
of	tolerance	without	invoking	an	ideal	of	individual	autonomy.	
Liberal	advocacy	of	personal	autonomy	is	still	a	 fairly	recent	and	
local	phenomenon.	To	make	sense	of	whatever	forms	of	toleration	we	
find	 in	pre-modern	 societies,	 or	 in	 those	parts	 of	 the	 contemporary	
world	where	only	 lip	 service	 is	 paid	 to	 liberal	 ideals,	we	must	 seek	
other	resources.	Fear,	scepticism	and	sheer	indifference	no	doubt	play	
their	 part,	 but	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 believe	 they	 are	 the	whole	 story.	 Those	
forms	of	human	involvement	considered	in	this	paper	long	pre-date	
the	advent	of	Enlightenment	doctrines	of	accommodation.	Tolerance	
and	forgiveness	within	friendship	(for	instance)	is	a	more	permanent	
feature	of	human	 life	 than	 the	 ideal	of	 respect	 for	 the	 autonomy	of	
the	rational	individual.	Could	our	doctrine	of	tolerance	as	civility	be	
applied	in	the	political	realm	or	to	the	criminal	law,	this	would	extend	
legal	toleration	beyond	the	borders	of	liberalism.34, 35
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